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Defamation, Anti-SLAPP Legislation, and the
Blogosphere: New Solutions for an Old Problem
Sean P. Trende'
The Constitution specifically selected the press, which includes not only newspapers, books, and magazines, but
also humble leaflets and circulars, to play an important
role in the discussion of public affairs.
~ Justice Hugo Black!

See even if I lose the cases. [sic] I'm still going to win because I'm [going to force them] to spend at least
$50,000.00 each in legal fees. Either way. [sic] I win.
-

Anthony DiMeo3

The story of the Internet is one of decentralization and democratization. The internet was born as a centralized, governmentsponsored experiment. Over time, the governmental model gave
way to domination by large commercial entities, as companies
such as America Online, Inc., and CompuServe, Inc., created and
hosted forums for people to gather online. Small-scale operations
existed, but they were generally reserved for persons with technical backgrounds, who had the time and resources to acquire the
knowledge needed to speak the language of the internet: HyperText Markup Language ("HTML").
While these companies remain major forces in the development
of the internet today, the advent of free, easy-to-use software that
enables self-publication on the internet and of fast broadband
connections that do not require even the click of a mouse to connect to the internet has reduced the influence of the middlemen,
leaving many webusers with nothing but a broadband connection
1. Associate, Hunton & Williams, LLP. J.D., Duke University School of Law, 2001;
B.A., Yale University, 1995. The views expressed in this article are my own, and are not
intended to in any way represent the views of my law firm. I would like to thank Sarah
Cottrill for encouraging me to write this article, and the staff of the Duquesne Law Review
for editing it. Thanks are not enough for the gratitude I owe my wife, for all her love and
support.
2. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (internal citation omitted).
3. E-mail from Anthony DiMeo to "Scott" (July 10, 2006) (on file with author).
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and Internet Explorer. This increased freedom has also resulted
in the rise of a new type of entity on the internet. Weblogs, or
"blogs" are typically run by small, unincorporated individuals,
sometimes as a mere pastime. Collectively, these blogs are known
as the "blogosphere," and much as a collection of water molecules
can become a tsunami of unimaginable power, so too can the collective power of the blogosphere wield tremendous significance.
Individual writers without large corporate backing have signed
book deals and made the New York Times Best-Seller list, largely
based on the readership "built from scratch" through their online
writings.4 Their power extends to politics as well - blogs can reasonably claim to have brought down a Senate Majority Leader,5
ended the career of a network news anchor,6 and defeated a sitting
Senator and recent vice-presidential candidate in a primary campaign.7
Like all emerging media, the blogosphere has had growing
pains, but bloggers have met many of these problems head-on.
For example, they have testified before Congress to ensure that
they would not be brought within the scope of federal campaign
finance laws.' Bloggers are, as of this writing, engaged in a battle
over "net neutrality," proposed legislation that would apply common carrier rules to internet service providers ("ISPs") and force
them to manage all internet traffic equally, and bar ISPs from de-

4. See, e.g., Warren St. John, Dude, Here's My Book, N.Y. TIMES, April 16, 2006, at 9-1
(describing new genre inspired by internet writers such as Tucker Max and George Ouzounian (aka "Maddox")).
5. Josh Marshall's "Talking Points Memo" and Glenn Reynolds "Instapundit" are
largely responsible for publicizing the comments made by Lott at Strom Thurmond's birthday party, which eventually led to Lott's downfall. Noah Schachtman, Wired News: Blogs
Make The Headlines, at http'//www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,56978,00.html (last
visited Nov. 27, 2006).
6. Little Green Footballs is widely credited with bringing about Dan Rather's retirement from television broadcasting by raising serious questions regarding the authenticity
of documents aired by CBS News. Brendan Bernhard, The Blogger Who Helped Dislodge
Dan Rather, available at http://daily.nysun.com/Repository/getmailfiles.asp?Style=
OliveXLib:ArticleToMail&Type=texthtml&Path=NYS/2005/02103&ID=ArO2lOO
(last visited Nov. 27, 2006). But see Bill Haltom, Instapundit done it: The blog that ate Dan Rather,
40 TENN. B.J. 30 (Nov. 2004).
7. Left-leaning blogs such as Daily Kos and MyDD supported Ned Lamont in his successful bid to unseat Senator Joe Lieberman (D-CT). Daily Kos: CT-Sen: Lieberman's TWO
Big Lies, http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/20067/6/215946/0196 (last visited July 8,
2006); Matt Stoller, Lieberman Gets Testy And Dishonest,
httpJ/www.mydd.com/story/200617/6/20843/14400 (last visited July 8, 2006).
8. Testifying Before Congress: "A Downpayment on Freedom of Speech",
httpJ/www.redstate.com/story/2005/9/2182137/1648 (last visited July 5, 2006).
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prioritizing certain non-commercial sites.9 But while the blogosphere has been busy combating attempts by Congress and ISPs
to regulate or potentially stifle their speech, they have largely ignored the renewed threat defamation law poses to their smallscale operations. In the long run, bloggers may find that clever
attorneys ultimately pose a greater threat to internet freedom
than does Congress. Making ambitious use of defamation law
principles intended to protect those with the inability to fight back
and of provisions in the Telecommunications Act intended to protect abused women, recent cases such as DiMeo v. Max ° illustrate
the challenges that modern defamation law poses to the emerging
blogosphere. DiMeo v. Max is a case where the rare "smoking
gun" exists: e-mails from the plaintiff to third parties indicating
that the plaintiff is well aware of the strategic advantage he holds
from the mere threat of running up the defendant's court costs."
Such smoking guns are rare, however, and while the number of
such suits is thus difficult to trace, the potential destructive toll is
easy to see.
While this threat has existed from the beginning of cyberspace the internet was still very much in its infancy when the first law
review article appeared with "defamation" and "internet" in the
title'2 - and while Congress made efforts to mitigate this threat in
the days when the internet was dominated by major organizations
- little has been done to protect a small-scale blogger who faces
the high costs of litigation, even if the published content is true or
if the comments were made by others on the blogger's blog or message board.
Because of the importance of the blogosphere as an emerging
medium, this Article suggests that Congress should adopt a federal statute to protect speakers from such "Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation" (SLAPPs). Such anti-SLAPP laws
could serve as a powerful deterrent against groundless suits. In
support of this thesis, the Article begins by exploring the growth of
the internet and its recent transformation into a medium domi-

9. Matt Stoller, Some Lessons From The Fight Over Internet Freedom,
http'/www.mydd.com/story/200615/28/14328/3630 (last visited July 6, 2006); Network Neutrality, http://en.wikipedia.orgwiki/Network-neutrality (last visited July 6, 2006).
10. 433 F. Supp. 2d 523 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
11. See infra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
12. Thomas D. Brooks, Catching Jellyfish in the Internet: The Public-Figure Doctrine
and Defamation on Computer Bulletin Boards, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 461
(1995).
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nated by individuals. Part II analyzes the current legal framework, including a brief overview of defamation law, and contains
an analysis of previous legal attempts to fit the internet into various defamation frameworks. Part III analyzes two cases as a
template for understanding the unique problems that the "new"
internet faces, while Part IV explores potential solutions to the
problem, and concludes that federal anti-SLAPP litigation would
be a strong step toward the protection of First Amendment freedoms on the internet.
I. THE GROWTH OF THE "NEW" INTERNET AS A DECENTRALIZED
COLLECTION OF SMALL PROPRIETORSHIPS

The Old Internet

A.

Ten years ago, Judge Stewart Dalzell referred to the internet as
"the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that ... the
world . . . has yet seen."13 Since that statement, however, the
internet has exploded to a degree of importance that was practically unimaginable in 1996. Today, this "international network of
interconnected computers" 4 hosts what amounts to a "neverending world-wide conversation," '" whereby billions of people and
their points of view are quite literally a mouse-click away. Yet it
was not that long ago that all computers were simply "dummy
terminals" - that is, computers that were unable to contact and
exchange data directly with other computers. A brief history of
the growth of the old, centralized internet follows.
1.

The Early Years

The internet was born in 1965, when researchers used an ordinary telephone line to connect two computers - one in Massachusetts and one in California - and allowed them to "speak" to one
another. 6 With that discovery began the trek toward the modern
internet. With funding from the Department of Defense a some13. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
14. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997), quoted in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,
129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997).
15. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 883.
16.

See Barry M. Leiner et al., A BriefHistory of the Internet, Internet Society,

http'//www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml#Origins (last visited July 6, 2006). For a
more thorough explication of this history, see Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem
of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 192-212 (2000).
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what larger network known as ARPANET1 7 was constructed in the
1960s and 70s.18 Following this achievement, different governmental entities began to set up their own internal networks. 9 As
this networking of computers spread, so to did the technologies
that enabled the networking. In 1972, electronic mail, or "e-mail"
was developed. The advent of "TCP/IP" technology followed,
which allowed users on any network to communicate with users
on a different network.2" The development of TCP/IP was a major
milestone, giving birth to the "network of networks" that characterizes the modern internet.2 '
It was not until 1984, however, that the number of internet
hosts grew to over one thousand.22 The pace of the development of
the internet picked up briskly from that point, as technology improved, and the National Science Foundation embarked upon an
intense effort to improve the internet's use. By 1992, there were
over one million servers in use, a thousand-fold increase over the
span of eight years.23 Use was spreading outside the government
as well. CompuServe, founded in 1969 as an in-house networking
company for Golden United Life Insurance Company, became a
major provider of home online services in the 1980s.24 Other companies such as America OnLine followed suit, beginning as small
Bulletin Board Services ("BBS") and growing rapidly.2 5
2.

Early Formats

The early formats operated by internet users must be explained
to understand early internet defamation litigation. For example,
many internet providers offered (and still offer, in much more advanced forms)26 "chat rooms," one of the oldest forms of internet
17. ARPANET stands for "Advanced Research Projects Agency Network." Wikipedia the Free Encyclopedia, ARPANET, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARPANET (last visited
Nov. 27, 2006).
18. Leiner, supra note 16.
19. Id.
20. See What is TCP/IP? - A Word Definition From The Webopedia Computer Dictionary, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/T/TCPIP.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2006).
21. Leiner, supra note 16.
22. Weinberg, supra notel6, at 193 n.27.
23. Id.
24. Wikipedia - the Free Encyclopedia, CompuServe, http-//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
CompuServe (last visited July 6, 2006).
25. Wikipedia - the Free Encyclopedia, AOL, http'/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AOL (last
visited July 6, 2006).
26. In many ways, the popular "Instant Messenger" software, or "IM," is nothing more
than an advanced, fast, highly flexible chat room.
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conversation. A chat room is a place where people have "realtime, synchronous conversations... by typing messages into their
computers."2 7 These messages, in turn, are posted in a particular
area, or "room," where various users in the rooms may read them.
Some rooms are available to all, while some rooms are available
only to a discrete number or subsection of individuals.
Another type of early "e-forum" was a "bulletin board" or "message board."28 Message board participants begin with a comment,
to which other participants or "users" respond. These responses
form a "thread," which - unlike a chat room - becomes a permanent part of the internet. While many chat rooms are "unmoderated," meaning no one follows or edits the content, most message
boards have a hierarchy of administrators, super moderators, and
moderators, all charged with different levels of responsibility for
maintaining the quality and consistency of the online discussion
by deleting posts and threads that are inconsistent with the
board's overall mission. Persons posting in both chat rooms and
message boards often post under pseudonyms, thereby concealing
their true identity. Message board users also can upload pictures,
or avatars, that will accompany every post, giving them something
of an "e-identity."
A unifying theme of these different media was that they generally required a large corporate entity in order to participate, or a
high degree of technical proficiency to create. "Dial-up" services
such as AOL and CompuServe usually hosted the web service, and
controlled the format in which people participated, almost always
for a hefty fee. This was about to change, however, with the advent of the World Wide Web.
B.

Growth of the "New" Internet: The Blogosphere

Today, the amount of information stored online is staggering, as
over a billion pages of information now are available to users
online.29 Modern computers are connected to each other through
thousands of networks of satellite signals, phone lines, fiber optic
lines, or cable TV lines. It is now estimated that the internet
27. Danielle M. Conway-Jones, Defamation in the DigitalAge: Liability in Chat Rooms,
on Electronic Bulletin Boards, and in the Blogosphere, SK102 ALI-ABA 63, 67 (2005).
28. E.g., httpJ/messageboard.tuckermax.com (last visited July 9, 2006).
29. Jennifer O'Brien, note, Putting a Face to a (Screen) Name: The FirstAmendment
Implications of Compelling ISPs to Reveal the Identities of Anonymous Internet Speakers in
Online Defamation Cases, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2745, 2748 n. 17 (2002).
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claims over one billion users worldwide - nearly one of every six
persons on the planet."
Three-hundred and thirty million of
those users are located in North America.31 The growth in third
world countries is especially astounding, with Africa and the Middle East experiencing over 400% growth in usage since 2000.32
Part of the reason for this explosive growth has been an expansion
in the availability of user-friendly technology that replaced the
fairly "clunky" BBS and chat room technology that dominated the
1980s.
1.

Early Development of the World Wide Web

The deployment of the briefly-successful "gopher" protocol,
whereby a user could easily retrieve information from other computers, 3 presaged the advent of the "World Wide Web." The
World Wide Web is a free service deployed by CERN, which makes
it possible for persons to easily link to other computers. Technology for this World Wide Web improved quickly. The first web
browser for use in Microsoft Windows - NCSA Mosaic - became
available in March of 1993, while a browser that enabled the use
of graphics as part of a webpage became available in January of
1994. Netscape - the first browser to use the tables that are now
the backbone of any webpage - came online in March of 1995. A
few months later, Microsoft released its now-famous Internet Explorer, ensuring that every person who bought a computer running on a Windows platform could get World Wide Web access.'
At the same time, technology was becoming more user-friendly,
and control of content was moving away from companies and toward the individual. Prodigy Communications Corporation was
an early ISP, which in addition to hosting the traditional bulletin
boards and chat rooms, provided access to the World Wide Web
and allowed hosting of individual member web pages.3 5 While the
30. Internet Usage World Stats, http://www.internetworldstats.com (last visited July 9,
2006). The author was made aware of this website by reading Danielle M. Conway-Jones,
Defamation in the Digital Age: Liability in Chat Rooms, on Electronic Bulletin Boards,and
in the Blogosphere, SK102 ALI-ABA 63, 67 (2005).
31. Id.
32. http'//www.internetworldstats.com (last visited July 9, 2006).
33. Wikipedia - the Free Encyclopedia, Gopher Protocol, http'//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Gopher.protocol#Decline (last visited July 6, 2006).
34. See WWW FAQs: What Was The First Web Browser,
http'//www.boutell.com/newfaq history/fbrowser.html (last visited July 9, 2006).
35. Wikipedia - the Free Encyclopedia, Prodigy ISP,
httpJ/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prodigy- %281SP%29 (last visited July 9, 2006).
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ability to create a webpage through HTML programming was a
somewhat rare talent, a major step had been taken toward the
democratization of cyberspace that took place in the 2000s.
2.

Enter the Blogs

The final steps toward the decentralization of cyberspace occurred as the dynamic blog began to influence - and to a certain
extent replace - static webpages. While the traditional website
can only be altered through a complicated series of code changes,36
a blog is an interactive online journal, whereby a poster can
quickly post his or her thoughts online through easy blogging
software. The concept existed in various forms for quite some
time, 37 but was not officially given the name "weblog" until 1997,
when web publisher Jorn Barger coined the term.38 The term was
subsequently shortened to "blog," and used both to connote the
website itself, as well as the act of writing the blog.39 In 1998, the
software Open Diary allowed users to permit comments by other
users on their site, turning one-sided, top-down commentary into
the conversation
that has come to characterize the internet to40
day.
Other sites, such as LiveJourna 41 and the wildly popular "Blogger"41 software soon followed. These sites allow a user to choose
from a variety of blog templates, and set up their own free blog in
about ten minutes without any technical expertise or understanding of programming languages. 43 A user then simply types his
thoughts in a dialogue box, gives the "post" a title, presses a button, and waits a few short seconds while the blog entry is auto36. Software such as Adobe GoLive makes programming easier.
37. In a very abstract sense, there is really nothing new about the idea of the blogosphere. As one commenter has noted, HAM radio operators and various newswires such
a Reuters and AOL have had online conversations for decades. Wikipedia - the Free Encyclopedia, httpJ/en.wikipedia.orgwiki/Blog#History.
Indeed, even the old USENET and
BBS functions of the internet mimicked modern blogs somewhat. Wikipedia - the Free
Encyclopedia, Blog, http://en.wikipedia.orgwiki/Blog#History (last visited July 6, 2006).
What makes the blogosphere so unique, though, is the ease with which one can make one's
voice heard. With the advent of the blogosphere, every person really does have their own
printing press.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Live Journal, http-/www.livejournal.com/ (last visited July 9, 2006).
42. Blogger, httpJ/www.blogger.com (last visited July 9, 2006).
43. Indeed, some of the most successful blogs on the internet still maintain their
"blogspot" prefix.
See, e.g., http'//atrios.blogspot.com/ (last visited July 9, 2006);
iraqthemodel.blogspot.com (last visited July 9, 2006).
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matically placed on the internet by the blogging software.44 Today,
blogs cover a stunning array of topics, from politics4 5 to sports" to
parenting.4 7
Blogging software thus took the highly specialized field of website design and made it available to the masses. In a few short
years, we have gone from the conversation of the internet being
dominated by message boards supported by large companies such
as AOL/Time Warner or Yahoo!, to an era where some of the biggest sites are run by sole proprietors. Thus, the blogger in many
ways epitomizes the "lonely pamphleteer" about which the Supreme Court so eloquently spoke in Branzburg v. Hayes. 8
For example, one of the most successful blogs on the internet is
Daily Kos, the brainchild of Markos Moulitsas Zuniga.4 9 Kos began as a poster on political consultant Jerome Armstrong's site
MyDD. As the result of his success as a poster there, Kos began
his own site, initially called fishyshark.com, before moving to his
current platform, "DailyKos.com." What began as a pastime that
rarely received comments" has morphed into one of the most
heavily trafficked sites on the internet.5 Daily Kos now receives
415,000 unique visits a day, and nearly twenty million visits per
month. 2 By way of contrast, in 1997, Matt Drudge's "Drudge Report" was considered to be among the "elite" websites when his
webpage brought in seventeen thousand visits per day. 3 While

44. Almost all blogs provide a "comment" field whereby a user can click and post his
own thoughts. Most blogs require some sort of registration, whereby a person inputs an email address, a name, and their own website, if appropriate. It is difficult - if not impossible - to verify that the name is correct, or that the name listed on the e-mail address is a
real name. Thus, posters on blogs, like their counterparts on message boards, maintain a
high degree of anonymity if they wish.
45. See, e.g., Instapundit, http'//www.instapundit.com (last visited July 9, 2006).
46. See, e.g., The Blue Gray Sky, http'/bluegraysky.blogspot.com/ (last visited July 7,
2006).
47. See, e.g., Dooce, http'//www.dooce.com/ (last visited July 8,2006).
48. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
49. See Daily Kos: About, http'//www.dailykos.com/special/about (last visited Nov. 27,
2006).
50. See Daily Kos: Archives, httpJ/web.archive.org/web/20020901165204/www.dailykos.
com/archives/2002 05.html (last visited July 9, 2006).
51. See Truth Laid Bear, http://truthlaidbear.com/ecotraffic.php (last visited Nov. 27,
2006).
52. SiteMeter, Counter and Statistics Tracker,
httpJ/www.sitemeter.com/?a=stats&s=sm8dailykos&r=25 (last visited July 9, 2006).
53. Michael Hadley, The Gertz Doctrine and Internet Defamation, 84 VA. L. REV. 477,
494 (1998) ("Only a small percentage of Web sites receive that kind of attention, and very
few of them are operated by a single person.").
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Kos brings in guest commenters to help run his front page, the
site is still run, owned, and operated by one man.
Daily Kos typically receives over two hundred comments in response to a single post.54 Given multiple postings and "diaries,"
the site receives approximately twelve thousand comments per
day.5" Obviously, managing and editing such content is nearly
impossible.
Blogging platforms such as "Scoop"" expand the
comment concept, and turn an individually-owned blog into the
equivalent of the corporate-owned BBS of the 1980s. With Scoop,
anyone can create a "diary" on a Scoop-supported blog, allowing a
user to keep her own "mini-blog" within the larger weblog"
This "freeware" has resulted in a sharp increase in the numbers
of both blog publishers and readers. A January 2005 poll for the
Pew Internet and American Life Project revealed that over eight
million people claimed to have created a blog or web-based diary,
while over thirty-two million people claimed to be blog readers.5 8
Numerous commenters have noted that the ease of use and relative availability of the blogosphere make blogs the "great democratizers" of speech. 9 As one analyst put it (in the context of blogging
for law firms), "[miuch like the Web, blogs are a very democratic
form of communication. With a very small investment and some
help from a web designer, there is virtually no difference between
a solo practitioner in outer Mongolia and an Am Law 100 firm." 0

54. See, e.g., Daily Kos: Cheers and Jeers: Wednesday
http'//www.dailykos.com/storyonly/ 2006/7/5/7452/32234 (last visited July 6, 2006).
55. Ana Marie Cox, Inside the Cult of Kos, httpA/www.time.com/time/nation/article/
0,8599,1201152,00.html (last visited July 9, 2006).
56. In Scoop's own words,
Scoop is a "collaborative media application." It falls somewhere between a content management system, a web bulletin board system, and a weblog. Scoop is
designed to enable your website to become a community. It empowers your visitors to be the producers of the site, contributing news and discussion, and making sure that the signal remains high.
Scoop, httpJ/scoop.kuro5hin.org/ (last visited July 4, 2006).
57. Scoop-style blogs are especially popular within the liberal blogosphere, where hightraffic blogs such as MyDD, TPMCafe, and Daily Kos all allow registered readers to author
diaries, which are then published on the front page. See MyDD, httpj/www.mydd.com/;
TPMCafe, http://www.tpmcafe.com/blog; Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/.
58. Pew Internet & American Life Project, Data Memo, (Jan. 2005), available at
http'//www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP-blogging-data.pdf. One site pegs the number as high
as forty-seven million blogs. See Technorati, About Technorati,
httpJ/www.technorati.comfabout (last visited July 8, 2006).
59. E.g., Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: ProtectingIntimate Relationship Privacy
Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 890 (2006).
60. David Gulbranson, Welcome to the Blawgsosphere, 20-APR CBA REC. 36, 37 (2006).
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Unfortunately, the growth of the blogosphere has not been
without problems. Comment fields on many blogs are often virtual warzones. Posters rarely have in-person interaction with
other posters, and hence become detached from their sense of personhood. This in turn leads to endless "flame wars" on many
blogs. The blogosphere has seen the rise of a variety of characters,
such as "trolling," a "purely mischief-making activity" whereby the
troll "initiates an antagonistic environment."6' Other types of
posters include characters such as "Mobys:" persons who go onto
websites, pose as someone with political views similar to those on
the website, and direct them to arguments that disfavor the political view espoused by the site.62
With a large number of comments, and a large number of persons making those comments dedicated to mischief-making
through a variety of techniques, it is difficult for a website operator to root out all possible instances of nasty speech on a given
website. One can imagine that a website such as Daily Kos would
have to hire hundreds of people to patrol the comments in search
of potentially false postings. Given common law defamation law,
this posed a real threat to the growing Internet community. Had
Congress not acted, comment-enabled blogs could well be impossible.

II. THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A rise to prominence always invites controversy, and the rise of
the blogosphere is no exception. This section briefly explores the
history of defamation law. It then embarks upon a more thorough
explication of courts' attempts to fit the emerging internet into the
old defamation rubric. It then examines Congress's attempt to
"fix" the courts' rulings, and subsequent case law.

61. Diane Rowland, Griping, Bitching and Speaking Your Mind: Defamation and Free
Expression on the Internet, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 519, 520 (2006).
62. The term seems to have grown out of musician Moby's urging of persons to attack
George W. Bush through right-wing websites. Moby suggested:
For example, you can go on all the pro-life chat rooms and say you're an
outraged right-wing voter and that you know that George Bush drove an exgirlfriend to an abortion clinic and paid for her to get an abortion. Then you go
to an anti-immigration website chat room and ask, "What's all this about
George Bush proposing amnesty for illegal aliens?"
Wikipedia - the Free Encyclopedia, Moby, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moby#Activism (last
visited July 9, 2006).
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The Basics of DefamationLaw

Defamation is an ancient tort, designed to protect a person from
false statements that are harmful to that person's reputation.3
The basic law of defamation can be summed up in a single sentence: "Defamation is committed when a false and defamatory
statement concerning another has been published to a third party,
absent privilege, and that statement causes damage or is so egregious that damages are presumed."' A communication is defamatory when "it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to
lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third
persons from associating or dealing with him." 5
From those basic rules, courts have carved an intricate lattice of
exceptions, definitions, and privileges. 66 For example, the common
law took the view that libel occurred each time a defamatory
statement was published, thus it treated one who repeated or otherwise republished a libelous statement as if he or she had actually published it.67 Distributors such as bookstores and libraries,
however, were found liable for republication of libel only if they
knew or had reason to know of the defamatory content. 6 Thus,
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §§ 558-59, 577 (1977). See also O'Brien, supra note
29, at 2750 & n.2 (describing sixteenth and seventeenth century origins of the tort).
64. Conway-Jones, supra note 27, at 65.
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 559.
66. Many of these exceptions are extremely important but are also irrelevant for the
purposes of this article, so it is sufficient to note in passing that plaintiffs face a higher
burden of proof if they are a "public figure" or "limited purpose public figure." A trio of
Supreme Court opinions lays out the basic framework. An elected official or public person
speaking on a matter of public concern must prove actual malice on the part of a defamatory speaker by clear and convincing evidence. The standard of proof for a private plaintiff
speaking on a matter of public concern is lower, and the standard for private plaintiffs
speaking on purely private matters is set by state law, but cannot be strict liability. See
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 375
(1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Also, a defamatory statement
may not be an expression of mere opinion, but rather must be factual in nature, or a statement of opinion that gives rise to a factual inference. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497
U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990). Thus, satire, parody, hyperbole, and invective are non-defamatory in
nature. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988); Old Dominion Branch No.
496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 264-65 (1974); Greenbelt Coop.
Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 6 (1970).
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 578. See also, e.g., Cianci v. New Times Pub.
Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980). This was true even if the republisher names or explicitly cites to the original publisher. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 578 cmt. b.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 581(b). See, e.g., Cubby Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.,
776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In addition to common law roots, this rule seems to
be based at least somewhat upon First Amendment guarantees. See Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959) (holding that a bookstore could not be found liable for sale of an
obscene book, absent knowledge of the book's contents).
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while a newspaper might have been found liable for defamation at
common law for unknowingly republishing an untrue story, the
newsstand that carried it would not be so liable, unless it knew or
had reason to know that the newspaper story contained untruths.
The common law extended these rules to emerging media such as
television and radio, and treated a libel broadcast by those media
as if it had been published by an original publisher.6 9
B.

The Complicationsof Defamation Law and the Internet

To early legal analysts it seemed a given that the Internet
would be treated no differently under the law of defamation than
any other print medium. The introduction to a 1996 article
opined: "Much of this activity [analyzing cyber-defamation] is
somewhat misleading .... Currently there are two reported decisions that are the primary focus of the 'cyberlibel' debate. They
rely not on arcane computer issues, but on familiar common law
principles.""0 This paralleled the initial attempts of courts to deal
with the advent of television and radio: Notwithstanding the attempts of Georgia to create a tort of "defamacast,"71 most courts
easily placed these new media into traditional categories. This
section begins with an explication of the two seminal cases of
internet defamation, and the Act that effectively mooted them
both. It then examines how courts have reacted to this congressional enactment by essentially creating a federal "defamanet"
standard, and how that reaction has served early ISPs and largescale operations well.
1.

Pre-CDA Caselaw

Prior to 1996, it was becoming increasingly obvious that online
sources would be treated as publishers for purposes of defamation
law.7'2 A pair of decisions from New York are considered the semi-

69. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) TORTS § 581(1).
70. James E. Stewart & Laurie J. Michelson, Cyberspace Defamation, 75 MICH. B.J.
510, 510 (1996).
71. Am. Broad.-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 126 S.E.2d 873, 882 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1962).
72. Probably the earliest case involving an untruth in cyberspace is Daniel v. Dow
Jones, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1987). Although not technically a defamation case, it is notable for its analogy of online services to newspapers. See id. at 337-38
("There is no functional difference between defendant's service and the distribution of a
moderate circulation newspaper or subscription newsletter. The instantaneous, interactive,
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nal developments in the early law of cyber-defamation. The first
decision is Cubby Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. 3 As discussed above, 4
CompuServe was an early internet bulletin board that served as
"an on-line general information service or 'electronic library' that
subscribers may access from a personal computer or terminal.""5
At that time, CompuServe users paid a fee to access this library,
which contained thousands of sources, as well as 150 special interest forums and bulletin boards."8
One of these forums was the Journalism Forum." This forum
was managed by an outside company, Cameron Communications,
Inc., which "manage[d], review[ed], create[d], delete[d], edit[ed],
and otherwise control[led] the contents in the Journalism Forum. 7 8 Ominously, the Journalism Forum contained a publication
entitled "Rumorville USA," which in turn was published on
CompuServe's server by an outside entity, Don Fitzpatrick Associates of San Francisco ("DFA").' 9
Plaintiffs Cubby, Inc. ("Cubby") and Robert Blanchard
("Blanchard") developed a service called "Skuttlebut," a database
that was intended to compete with Rumorsville. ° Apparently
fearing this new competition, Rumorsville published statements
alleging that Skuttlebut was a "new start up scam" that had
gained access to information from Rumorsville "through some
back door."' Incensed, Plaintiffs sued for libel, business disparagement, and unfair competition.82 CompuServe conceded that the
statements were defamatory, but argued that it was merely a distributor of the information, and therefore was not liable under
traditional defamation law principles. s3
The Cubby Court found for CompuServe. It found that CompuServe products were more akin to libraries than to a printing
press, and that "CompuServe's CIS product is in essence an electronic, for-profit library that carries a vast number of publications
computerized delivery of defendant's service does not alter the facts: plaintiff purchased
defendant's news reports as did thousands of others.").
73. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
74. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
75. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 137.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
79. Id.
80. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 138.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83 Id
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and collects usage and membership fees from its subscribers in
return for access to the publications." 4 The court, however, did
not set out a broad rule of distributor-style immunity for webbased applications; rather it emphasized CompuServe's lack of
editorial control85 and explained that a rule that required a "national distributor of publications" to "monitor each issue of every
periodical it distributes" would be "an impermissible burden on
the First Amendment."86 The Cubby court also noted that
"CompuServe and companies like it are at the forefront of the information industry revolution" and that "[tiechnology is rapidly
transforming the information industry."7 These words indicate
that the Cubby court sensed that it had not issued the last word
on the issue and was aware that a future decision would likely
limit, expand, or otherwise alter the holding in Cubby.
That decision came four years later in Stratton Oakmont Inc. v.
Prodigy Services Co."8 Perhaps the most interesting thing about
Stratton Oakmont is that the court seemed to have little sense
that it was about to change the course of legal history - indeed the
Stratton Oakmont decision was unpublished. In that case, a securities firm sued Prodigy for allegedly defamatory statements made
by a poster on a Prodigy message board. 9 Postings claimed that
(a) STRATTON OAKMONT, INC. ("STRATTON"), a securities investment banking firm, and DANIEL
PORUSH, STRATTON's president, committed criminal
and fraudulent acts in connection with the initial public
offering of stock of Solomon-Page Ltd.;
(b) the Solomon-Page offering was a "major criminal
fraud" and "100% criminal fraud;"
(c) PORUSH was "soon to be proven criminal" and

84. Id. at 140.
85. "While CompuServe may decline to carry a given publication altogether, in reality,
once it does decide to carry a publication, it will have little or no editorial control over that
publication's contents. This is especially so when CompuServe carries the publication as
part of a forum that is managed by a company unrelated to CompuServe." Cubby, 776 F.
Supp. at 140.
86. Id. (quoting Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co., 745 F.2d 123, 139 (2d Cir. 1984)).
87. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140.
88. 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
89. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *2.
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(d) STRATTON was a "cult of brokers who either lie for a
living or get fired." °
Stratton Oakmont was not amused by these statements, and sued
Prodigy for one hundred million dollars in compensatory damages
and one hundred million dollars in punitive damages.9
Stratton Oakmont's theory was that Prodigy was liable as a
publisher rather than as a mere distributor because, unlike
CompuServe, Prodigy edited the content of the posts to protect
consumers from sexual or otherwise offensive postings. The Stratton Oakmont court soundly rejected Prodigy's arguments that it
should not be punished for editing the content of its message
boards:
That such control is not complete and is enforced both as
early as the notes arrive and as late as a complaint is
made, does not minimize or eviscerate the simple fact
that Prodigy has uniquely arrogated to itself the role of
determining what is proper for its members to post and
read on its bulletin boards.92
Thus, the Stratton Oakmont court found that in Prodigy's case,
the act of attempting to control the content of its publication:
"PRODIGY's conscious choice, to gain the benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a greater liability than CompuServe and
other computer networks that make no such choice."93
2.

The CommunicationsDecency Act of 1996

The potentially devastating effects of this decision for the internet - which was just then being thrust into the public eye - were

immediately apparent. Under Stratton Oakmont and Cubby,
a
message board operator had two choices: either abstain from editing content and become a passive conduit for information, or attempt to edit content to an almost impossible extent.
This presented something of a perverse incentive. An operator
that made no attempt to identify and root out crass, obscene, or
even defamatory content, or engage in "undue self-censorship to
90. Id. at *1.
91. James E. Stewart & Laurie J. Michelson, Cyberspace Defamation, 75 MICH. B.J.
510, 511 (1996).
92. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4.
93. Id. at *5.
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avoid the negative consequences of speaking"9 was excused from
liability, while an operator who attempted to root out such speech
could be punished for unsuccessful efforts. The chilling effect this
could have on speech was profound. As the Fourth Circuit would
later explain,
Interactive computer services have millions of users....
The amount of information communicated via interactive
computer services is therefore staggering. The specter of
tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would have
an obvious chilling effect. It would be impossible for service providers to screen each of [its] millions of postings
for possible problems. Faced with potential liability for
each [republished] message, interactive computer service
providers might choose to severely restrict the number
and type of messages posted.9"
In a propitious coincidence, Congress was considering a massive
overhaul of telecommunications law at the time that the Stratton
Oakmont decision came out. Arguably the most important Act of
the 104th Congress, the law represented a massive deregulation of
the telecommunications industry. Tucked away in Title V, however, were a few provisions related to the internet, called the
Communications Decency Act.9" While this portion of the Act was
largely - and most famously - an attempt to stop the spread of
pornography online, Title V also contained a few sections intended
to remove publisher liability as a theory for proceeding against
internet publishers. In the wake of the Stratton Oakmont decision, ISPs labored heavily to ensure that the CDA provisions were
included in the final version of the Act.
The explicit goal of the CDA was to overrule Stratton Oakmont
and make it possible for ISPs to edit their content without taking
on publisher liability.97 The debates surrounding that Act empha-

94. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855 (2000).
95. Zeran v. America Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
96. Pub. L. No. 104-104 (known as the Communications Decency Act, or "CDA").
97. Jae Hong Lee, note, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal: Defamation Liability
for Third-Party Content on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 473-74 (2004). Lee
notes that the House Conference Report states that "[olne of the specific purposes of § 230
is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have
treated providers and users as publisher or speakers [of] objectionable material." H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996).
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sized the extraordinary pressures placed upon ISPs.
gressman explained:
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One Con-

There is no way [these] entities ... can take the responsibility to edit out information that is going to be coming
in to them from all manner of sources.... [This] is going
to be thousands of pages of information every day, and to
have that imposition imposed on them is wrong.9 8
In final form, the CDA contained a number of specific findings,
which made it the official policy of the United States to encourage
the growth of the World Wide Web and to ensure that ISPs could
edit obscene or offensive materials without incurring greater iability. For example, the CDA found that the internet was "a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities
for cultural development, and myriad avenues of intellectual activity."99 It further explained that it was "the policy of the United
States . . . to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market
that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation."' 0
To achieve these ends, and to address the holding in Stratton
Oakmont, the Act bluntly declares that "[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider."'
This sentence effectively "overrides the traditional treatment of publishers, distributors, and speakers under
statutory and common law,"0 2 uprooting years of state common
law and ensuring that providers of interactive computer services basically, ISPs °3 - could not be found liable for defamatory content. On its face, a fair reading of the act might suggest that the
CDA retained distributor liability for ISPs. The cases that followed, however, interpreted the law in a much broader manner.

98. 141 Cong. Rec. H8460- 01, H84-1 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995), quoted in O'Brien, supra
note 29, at 2755 & n.69. Of course, today a single site can process that much information.
99. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3).
100. Id. § 230(b)(2).
101. Id. § 230(c)(1).
102. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003).
103. The Act defines a provider of interactive computer service as "[any person or entity
that is responsive, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
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Post-CDA Caselaw
a.

Zeran v. America Online, Inc.

04

In April of 1995, shortly after the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City, a poster on a popular AOL
message board began advertising "Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts."
These ads described t-shirts that included "offensive and tasteless
slogans" related to the Oklahoma City bombing, and an instruction to call "Ken" at a certain phone number. The advertisement
instructed people to "call back if busy" due to the high demand for
the t-shirts. 10 5 The phone number connected to the house of Kenneth Zeran, who, according to the pleadings, did not sell the offensive t-shirts. 10 6 Despite attempts by AOL to remove the messages,
news spread quickly. A DJ at KRXO in Oklahoma City caught
word of the posting, and urged listeners to call the number and
express their displeasure."7 Unsurprisingly, Zeran was inundated
with phone calls and death threats - after ten days of such postings, Zeran was receiving threatening phone calls every two minutes.0 9 Even after an Oklahoma newspaper reported that the
shirts were a hoax and KRXO issued an on-air apology, Zeran received up to fifteen calls a day in response to the post. 0 9
Zeran sued American Online for defamation in the Western District of Oklahoma; the case was transferred to the Eastern District
The district court
of Virginia, where AOL is headquartered.'
dismissed Zeran's claims. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
The Fourth Circuit's holding was of surprising breadth to many.
Zeran argued that the CDA eliminated only publisher liability and
retained distributor liability for ISPs. Such a holding would have
maintained AOL's liability in the event that Zeran could prove
that AOL knew or had reason to know of the defamatory nature of
the posting."' The Zeran court disagreed, emphasizing that "pub104. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
105. Zeran, 129 F.3d 327. The slogans included "Visit Oklahoma ... It's A Blast!!!" and
"Finally A Day Care Center That Keeps The Kids Quiet - Oklahoma 1995." David A.
Myers, Defamation and the Quiescent Anarchy of the Internet:A Case Study of Cyber Targeting, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 667, 671 n.20 (2006) (suggesting that the § 230 of the CDA be
narrowed to account for "targeting" or "cyber-bullying").
106. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1128 (E.D. Va. 1997).
111. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331; supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
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lication" was an essential element of the tort of defamation regardless of whether the defendant happened to be a bookstore or
1
an author."
In this sense, the Fourth Circuit explained, the distributor/publisher dichotomy in the context of the CDA only exists
within the larger category of "publisher." The Fourth Circuit
therefore held that "Stratton and Cubby do not . .. suggest that

distributors are not also a type of publisher for purposes of defamation law.""'
The Fourth Circuit also held that notice of the defamatory content of a post does not transform an ISP from a publisher to a distributor. Rather, the court explained that such a rule would
thwart the purposes of the CDA.1 1 4 The Zeran court went so far as

to suggest that a contrary interpretation could raise serious First
Amendment concerns:
If computer service providers were subject to distributor
liability, they would face potential liability each time they
receive notice of a potentially defamatory statement-from
any party, concerning any message. Each notification
would require a careful yet rapid investigation of the circumstances surrounding the posted information, a legal
judgment concerning the information's defamatory character, and an on-the-spot editorial decision whether to
risk liability by allowing the continued publication of that
information. Although this might be feasible for the traditional print publisher, the sheer number of postings on
interactive computer services would create an impossible
burden in the Internet context. Because service providers would be subject to liability only for the publication of
information, and not for its removal, they would have a
natural incentive simply to remove messages upon notification, whether the contents were defamatory or not.
ThuS, like strict liability, liability upon notice has a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech.1
The court also noted that imposing notice-based liability upon
ISPs would give "a no-cost means to create the basis for future
lawsuits" to third parties. Because of the havoc a group of eager
112. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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third persons could cause by simply claiming that posted information was defamatory, the Court concluded that "[blecause the
probable effects of distributor liability on the vigor of Internet
speech and on service provider self-regulation are directly contrary to § 230's statutory purposes, we will not assume that Congress intended to leave liability upon notice intact."" 6
b.

Blumenthal v. Drudge"7

The Zeran decision has engendered a number of similar cases
that expanded upon its broad scope. In 1995, Matt Drudge began
publishing a website entitled "The Drudge Report.""' The Drudge
Report began as essentially an internet gossip column that contained links to various online publications and news stories. It
also published a newsletter that quickly spread in prominence - in
1995 it had one thousand subscribers, but by 1997 it had grown to
85,000 subscribers." 9
The Drudge Report was published by
"Wired" Magazine and displayed on the internet by "HotWired,"
one of the early online journals.2 ° In 1997, the Drudge Report
moved to AOL.' 2 '
On August 10, 1997, the Drudge Report published a story alleging that incoming Assistant to the President Sid Blumenthal had
a history of domestic violence.122 The next day, Blumenthal's
counsel directed a letter to Drudge, demanding a retraction.
Drudge complied.'23 Drudge also sent an e-mail retracting the
story, and publicly apologized to the Blumenthals.'24 The Blumenthals nonetheless pursued litigation in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, suing both Drudge and AOL.
The Blumenthals argued that their case was distinguishable
from Zeran in that AOL had a license agreement with Drudge and
retained some editorial rights over Drudge's posts, whereas AOL
had merely been a passive actor with regard to the anonymous

116. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
117. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
118. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 47.
119. Id.
120. Wired, http'//www.wired.com/.
121. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 47. Drudge would later gain notoriety as the entity
that broke the Monica Lewinsky scandal during President Clinton's term. Drudge Report,
http'//www.drudgereport.com/ml.htm (last visited July 7, 2006).
122. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 46.
123. Id. at 48.
124. Id.
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posts that resulted in Zeran's tormenting."' The court reluctantly
rejected this argument. Although conceding that AOL would certainly be considered a publisher or at least a distributor at common law, the court noted that "[iun some sort of tacit quid pro quo
arrangement with the service provider community, Congress has
conferred immunity from tort liability as an incentive to Internet
service providers to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other
offensive material, even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or
not even attempted."'26 Thus, according to the district court, an
i ISP is immune from suit even when defamatory content is provided by an ISP's business partner, as opposed to an anonymous
third party.
c.

Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. America Online, Inc.'27

In Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. America Online, Inc., the Tenth
Circuit immunized an ISP from liability even when the ISP actively took part in developing the false statements. Ben Ezra involved AOL's Quotes & Portfolios service, where stock quotation
information was continuously updated throughout the day.'
While two independent third parties provided the information to
AOL, AOL sometimes deleted or edited the information.'2 9 Plaintiffs, a company about which AOL had provided inaccurate information, argued that this rendered AOL both an interactive computer service and an information content provider.'
The Tenth Circuit disagreed. Even though AOL did work with
third parties to correct errors in its publication, the Tenth Circuit
held that "Plaintiff has not demonstrated Defendant worked so
closely with ComStock and Townsend regarding the allegedly inaccurate stock information that Defendant became an information
content provider." 3' The court explained: "By deleting . . . symbols, however, Defendant simply made the data unavailable and
did not develop or create the stock quotation information displayed."'32 Thus, even though the CDA defines an information
content provider as "any person or entity that is responsible, in
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 51.
Id.
206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000).
Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 983.
Id. at 985-86.
Id. at 985.
Id.
Id.
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whole or in part, for the creation or development of information,"'33 the court nonetheless found that AOL was not an information content provider.
d.

Closing Thoughts

Taken together, these three cases comprise a very broad grant
of near-immunity for an ISP. An ISP may take an active role in
the creation of content through edits and still retain its freedom
from liability under the CDA. Although a few courts have deviated from the Zeran-Blumenthal-Ben Ezra line of cases,' most
courts have not. Thus, in almost all parts of the country, an ISP
can feel secure that it will not be held liable for publication of content, even when it takes an active role in the publication of the
content. While this virtual immunity ends almost all concern for a
large company, it still does not remove the threat of very real injury to bloggers and other denizens of the "new internet."
III. UNIQUE PROBLEMS RELATING TO DEFAMATION

IN THE "NEW INTERNET"
While cases have long existed involving defamation claims as a
result of chat rooms 35 or message boards, almost all of those cases
have involved large companies being sued. But what happens
when the defendant is a smaller company, or even a sole proprietor? These entities are especially vulnerable to Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation, or SLAPPs. In an era where the vitality of the internet is increasingly dependent upon such small
entities, the chilling effect posed by vindictive litigation is
uniquely threatening to a medium that Congress has declared to
be protected pursuant to the public policy of the United States.
This section analyzes the chilling effect that SLAPP lawsuits potentially have on bloggers and other small companies, and examines a recent example of such a case.

133. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 2004). See also
Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing, but not deciding, that the CDA
removed only publisher liability).
135. See, e.g., Marczeski v. Law, 122 F. Supp. 2d 315, 325-27 (D. Conn. 2000).
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Six Years of Silencing John Doe

In 2000, just as blogs were becoming popular, Professor Lyrissa
Lidsky published an article entitled "Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse In Cyberspace."136 In it, Professor Lidsky worried that the high costs of litigation would pose a serious threat to
the growth of the internet, as frivolous lawsuits were used to silence website publishers. As Professor Lidsky observed, "many
defamation actions are not really about money."'37 Indeed, as Professor Lidsky notes, a core function of defamation law is to chill
speech. 3 ' Because the remedy of injunctive relief is, generally
speaking, unavailable to a defamation plaintiff,'39 and because libel suits are difficult to win (but are easy to bring),4 ° a defamation
plaintiffs only hope is often to scare the speaker into recanting.
Thus, corporations often issue press releases coinciding with their
decision
to sue, as part of a concerted effort to discredit a plain4

tiff.'

Lidsky noted the unique threat that the chill of litigation posed
to smaller entities. She explained that "chilling-effect arguments
have particular resonance in cases involving 'nonmedia' defendants like those typically sued in the new Internet libel cases."
Lidsky noted that the high cost of litigation alone posed a strong
disincentive against continuing an internet commentary.' 3 If this
was true of the internet six years ago, it is only more so today.
With the explosion of small proprietorships in cyberspace, the
average internet participant is increasingly vulnerable to lawsuits. When Lidsky wrote her article, most webpages were still in
static format.'" With almost all individually-run sites now including vigorous discussion in comments, and some even including
message boards or Scoop-style blogs-within-blogs, the potential for

136. 49 DuKE L. J. 855 (2000).
137. Id. at 872.
138. Id. at 888.
139. Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
140. Lidsky, supra note 94, at 883. Indeed, only 13% of defamation Plaintiffs are successful. Id. at 875.
141. Id. at 876-77.
142. Id. at 888-89.
143. Id. at 891. See also Susan M. Giles, Taking FirstAmendment ProcedureSeriously:
An Analysis of Process in Libel Litigation, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1753, 1789 (1988) ("[Ilt is now
clear that chill on speakers comes not just from fear of damage awards but also from concern about the costs of litigation.").
144. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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a lawsuit against an individual website proprietor is much greater
today than it was in 2000.
To emphasize the point, consider the defendants in the seminal
CDA cases cited above: CompuServe, Prodigy, and AOL. While
none of these major corporations are eager to expend money on
litigation, they certainly have the resources to do so if necessary.
For the average blogger, this is simply not the case. Given that
the average associate salary at many large firms is around $300
per hour, a motion to dismiss and reply brief that took forty hours
to write, edit, and file would place the cost of litigation at $12,000.
This assumes the associate did all of the work, no oral argument
is granted, and no discovery is served with the motion. If a partner edits the brief, her $500 per hour rate would break the bank
for most individuals.
Cost is not the only concern for the average blogger. While most
large corporations have some sort of in-house legal function to give
advice on these matters, the average blogger - indeed even largescale bloggers - do not have such niceties at their disposal. Unless
the blogger is fortunate enough to have a loyal legal following on
his blog, he may not be aware of the CDA limitation on his liability, or have any clue how to respond to a complaint or cease-anddesist letter. The average American, in the author's experience, is
quite uncomfortable with the legal system; faced with a demand
for litigation, most people may well conclude that it is simply not
worth it, and remove the offending post. Even obtaining competent representation is a concern - many lawyers who are within
the cost range for an individual Defendant will be unfamiliar with
the intricacies of defamation law, and perhaps even with the CDA
provisions. Thus, for the average citizen, the mere threat of a
lawsuit can spell financial ruin. In such circumstances, removing
the speech is the logical course of action, regardless of the merits
of the lawsuit.
B.

Examples of SLAPP Lawsuits Involving Small Entities

These concerns are not merely theoretical. Two lawsuits serve
as examples of how a clever plaintiff can try to use the threat of
litigation to silence non-defamatory speech that it does not like.
While the defendants in these two cases fought back, there are
certainly numerous examples that go undetected where the defendant merely throws up her hands, and removes the "offensive"
material.
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FindingOne's Self in "U-Hell"

The first case is U-Haul International,Inc. v. Osborne.' 5 In that
case, Osborne and his roommate rented a U-Haul truck to move
from Florida to Georgia.' 6 The truck apparently broke down several times in the course of what would otherwise have been an
eight-hour trip. U-Haul also attempted to force the duo to pay for
the extra costs and repairs to the truck.'4 7 After complaining to UHaul and the Better Business Bureau, the defendants decided to
take their case to the internet!" Osborne created a site named
"The U-Hell Website: Misadventures in Moving." The site operated as a forum
where he told his tales, and others could tell their
9
tales as well.'
U-Haul sued defendants, not in Georgia or Florida, but rather in
Arizona, on the theory that defendants had "published" there.
According to Lidsky, this was a strategic ploy to increase the cost
of litigation, by forcing defendants to travel cross-country for hearings and to deprive them of local counsel. 5 ' Fortunately, the
ACLU of Arizona stepped in to defend the defendants, at which
point U-Haul promptly dropped the suit, and threatened litigation
in Georgia. It is unclear how this lawsuit was eventually resolved.
It seems obvious, however, that U-Haul's decision to bring the suit
in an inconvenient forum until competent counsel appeared in
that jurisdiction belies a strategic decision on U-Haul's part to run
up the defendants' costs. While the defendants here decided to
fight back, many defendants would simply have acceded to UHaul's demands.
2.

DiMeo v. Max 5 '

If the facts of the "U-Hell" case are disturbing, a recent case
from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is outright horrifying.
Anthony DiMeo v. Tucker Max grew out of a series of posts on the
popular internet message board "Tuckermax.com." Anthony DiMeo, III, is the owner of several companies, including a blueberry
145. No. CIV 98-0366. There does not seem to be a version of this case available online,
so I base my analysis entirely on the explication found in Lidsky, supra note 94, at 891-93.
146. Lidsky, supra note 94, at 891.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 891.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 892.
151. 433 F. Supp. 2d 523 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
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farm (DiMeo Farms, LLC), and a promotions company (Renamity,
Inc.).'52 In his own words, DiMeo is "a highly respected young professional with a powerful background in public relations, special
event production, and multi-media marketing for luxury
brands.""' In addition, he is a self-described actor and wealth
manager."
M

Tucker Max owns a popular website appropriately named
"Tuckermax.com""' Max's website was initially a "date application page" put up as the result of a lost bet.'56 Over time the site
morphed into a collection of stories about Max's life, and now includes a collection of pictures of Max's ex-girlfriends,"' the
"Tucker Max Female Rating System,"15 and Max's suggested reading list.'59 Max's site grew from relative obscurity to become one of
the most heavily trafficked non-commercial sites on the internet.
An "Alexa" search conducted on July 1, 2006 indicates that Max's
site is the 6,069th most heavily trafficked site on the internet.6 0 By
way of contrast, the website for the Cleveland Plain Dealer - the
leading newspaper for one of the nation's largest metropolitan areas - is not even in the top 200,000 sites. 6 ' Max is the sole proprietor and author of the site.
TuckerMax.com also contains a message board, which has over
28,000 readers.'6 2 Discussion on the board is wide-ranging. For
example, one thread on "The Advice Board" contains a detailed
discussion of postmodernist theory.' On the "Pop Culture Board,"

152. Civil Action Complaint ("Compl.") I 6(e); see also Renamity,
http://www.renamity.con/who.html.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Tucker Max, http//www.tuckermax.com (last visited July 9, 2006).
156. Tucker Max, http://www.tuckermax.com/archives/entries/date-application.phtml
(last visited July 9, 2006).
157. Tucker Max, http'//www.tuckermax.conarchives/entries/pictures.phtml (last visited July 9, 2006).
158. Tucker Max, http://www.tuckermax.com/archiveslentries/
the_tucker_max_femalerating _system.phtml (last visited July 9, 2006).
159. Tucker Max, httpJ/www.tuckermax.com/archives/entries/
thetuckermaxreadinglist. phtml (last visited July 9, 2006).
160. Alexa, http'//www.alexa.com/data/details/?url=www.tuckermax.com (last visited
July 9, 2006).
161. Alexa, http://www.alexa.com/data/details/?url=www.plaindealer.com
(last visited
July 9, 2006).
162. Tucker Max, http'//messageboard.tuckermax.com (last visited July 9, 2006).
163. Tucker Max, httpJ/messageboard.tuckermax.com/showthread.php?t=1400 ("PWJ
Explains Postmodernism") (last visited July 9, 2006).
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members can discuss the children's book "Harry Potter."164 Three
clicks away, however, on 'Permanent Threads" is "The Porn
Thread," where members (obviously) post links to pornography,
and "The Member's Boobie Thread," which content is similarly
obvious.'
That message board is at the heart of the controversy
in this case.
For reasons that are somewhat obscure, there is a history of
confrontation between the denizen's of Max's Message board and
DiMeo. Max's message board has been through many iterations,
some of which are no longer available through the internet, but it
is clear that the conflict was longstanding as of January of 2005,
when Max detailed a million dollar lawsuit that DiMeo had filed
against the Philadelphia Weekly as a result of a parody of his
holiday card by Weekly columnist Jessica Pressler.'66 The reaction
on Max's message board was immediate, visceral, and extended
for over fourteen pages.
For example, one poster known as "CJ*" wrote "God, that guy
has absolutely ZERO sense of humor. I can't believe no one has
6 7 Similarly, "Wahoo" gives this piece of advice:
killed him yet.""
"Sit down, really look at that picture, and take a deep breath. Stop
f*cking imagining yourself as an old-money, world-wise, sophisticated,16- aristocratic, princely fellow. You're the only one that sees
that."
From that thread forward, comments on DiMeo's life were a
staple of the Tucker Max Message board. Shortly after the above
thread went up, a thread was posted soliciting photoshopped versions of his famous holiday card.'6 9 Two months later, the message
board again mocked DiMeo's lawsuit, in response to a "cease and
desist" letter that DiMeo's attorney had sent to the webmaster for
the message board, demanding that the board "[k]indly cease and
desist from utilizing my client, Anthony DiMeo III, for any content
whatsoever on TuckerMax.com or any other Internet outlets for
(last
164. Tucker Max, http://messageboard.tuckermax.com/showthread.php?t=9886
visited July 9, 2006).
165. Tucker Max, httpJ/messageboard.tuckermax.com/showthread.php?t=1O (last visited
July 9, 2006).
(last
166. Tucker Max, http://messageboard.tuckermax.com/showthread.php?t=1414
visited July 9, 2006).
(last
167. Tucker Max, http://messageboard.tuckermax.com/showthread.php?t=1414
visited July 9, 2006).
168. Tucker Max, http'//messageboard.tuckermax.com/
showthread.php?t=1414&page=4&pp=10 (last visited July 9, 2006).
(last
169. Tucker Max, http://messageboard.tuckermax.com/showthread.php?t=1420
visited July 9, 2006).
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that matter."17 ° A poster named "IbrakeForSox" revealed DiMeo's
e-mail address and noted that "[hie's got a neat, nice little page
there from which we can all harass him. What a fPcking
c*cksmoker." 7' In September, the board again mocked his website.72

On New Year's Eve of 2005, Mr. DiMeo threw a New Year's Eve
party that some say ended in shambles. 73 According to the district
court's opinion, Mr. DiMeo's company threw a party where twice
as many people showed up as the company had contracted to
serve. According to the district court, when the food and liquor
ran out, "[patrons seeking food burst through the doors leading
into a dining room of Kabir's Le Jardin restaurant. Two mixedmedia works on loan by Antonio Puri were stolen from museum
walls. Sconces were torn. Someone tried to haul off the donations
box. Kabir, fearing injuries, called police about 10:30 p.m."'74
The reaction from Max was immediate. On January 3, Max
published an entry on his website entitled "Sometimes Failure Is
Funny: DiMeo's NYE Party."''
In his entry he wrote "[iut looks
like Dimeo had a f*cking disaster at his NYE party, and totally
f*cked over everybody who came. Anthony, maybe it's time to stop
running from your destiny and go farm blueberries full time!"' 6
Defendant provided links to two news stories, one from the Philly
Metro's website and one from NBC 10 News's website.
Nearly two-hundred responses were posted. Some were colorful,
to say the least:
"'Anthony DiMeo III . . . owner of local PR company . . . , financial planner, and actor.' a.k.a. A

rich kid who just gets to try a whole bunch of sh*t
until he f~cks it all up and ends up in the family

170. Tucker Max, http://messageboard.tuckermax.com/showthread.php?t=2222
(last
visited July 9, 2006).
171. Id. See also DiMeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 527 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
172. Tucker Max, http://messageboard.tuckermax.com/showthread.php?t=4997
(last
visited July 9, 2006).
173. DiMeo, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (stating that "Renamity, Anthony DiMeo's publicity
firm, organized what turned out to be the New Year's Eve party from hell"; setting forth the
events of that night; and citing various articles about the same).
174. Id.
175. Tucker Max, http://messageboard.tuckermax.com/showthread.php?t=6720
(last
visited July 9, 2006).
176. Id.
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business living with his parents. Way to go you
you [sic] lazy-eyed retard!"177
"

"So basically this was a party for 700 of the uglicreatures of the night
est, slack-jawed, walleyed
78
that reside in Philly;'

*

"I have three words for the owner of the restaurant . . . Breech [sic] of contract! Sue him for all
he's got! Even better, sue him for all he doesn't
[sic]! All those frivolous lawsuits you have against
people (not to mention the ones you threatened
people
17 with) are finally biting you in the a**, Antnee." 9

*

"I'm beginning to think the face he makes in every
photo is one of concentration. His good eye sees
the camera. He stares at it in shock for a second
or two, until realizes that yes, that most definitely
is the person he payed [sic] to photograph him.
Panic strikes. His lazy eye is firmly fixed upon
His mind goes
the photographers [sic] shoe.
blank, his jaw goes slack. The only thing he can
think of is getting not one, but both eyes, on the
camera.18 Then the flash goes, and he fails yet
"
again. 0

*

"Grasshoppper Recipe.... I sh*t you not. 25 ml
BOLS - Peppermint (Creme de Menthe) 25 ml
BOLS - Creme de Cacao (Clear) 35 ml Double
Cream Anybody care to speculate as to the origins
of the cream? I didn't know you could mix the 3
biggest queen liquers [sic] into one cocktail. Guys,
did it come with a little umbrella? Seriously.
Amazing."1"'

DiMeo countered with a lawsuit filed in Pennsylvania State
Court, which Max promptly removed to the Eastern District of
177. Id. at 1 (statement of"footinmouth").
178. Id. at 2 (statement of "moistpanties").
179. Id. at 4 (statement of"leavemealone").
180. Id. at 10 (statement of"downwiththepants").
181. Id. at 15 (statement of"Ribalding").
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Pennsylvania. 8 ' DiMeo objected to six posts made on the message
board, none of which were made by Max. 8 3 DiMeo sued for various sorts of defamation.
DiMeo also brought suit under provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act, signed by President Bush on January 5,
2006, which makes it a crime to "makeO a telephone call or utilizeD a telecommunications device, whether or not conversation or
communication ensues, without disclosing his identity and with
intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the
called number or who receives the communications.""'
Mr. DiMeo's lawsuit is arguably the essence of a SLAPP. First,
the Third Circuit had already determined that the CDA removed
both publisher and distributor liability from an ISP such as Mr.
Max. In Green v. AOL,'8 5 the Third Circuit wrote:
There is no real dispute that Green's fundamental tort
claim is that AOL was negligent in promulgating harmful
content and in failing to address certain harmful content
on its network. Green thus attempts to hold AOL liable
for decisions relating to the monitoring, screening, and
deletion of content from its network - actions quintessentially related to a publisher's role. Section 230 "specifically proscribes liability" in such circumstances.
DiMeo's cause of action under the VAWA Re-authorization was
even worse. As Judge Dalzell noted, "DiMeo bases Count Two on
a criminal statute, and he does not even try to show that
§ 223(a)(1)(3) provides a private right of action."'8 6 Moreover, Max
did not post anonymously, as required by the statute, and as

182.
183.

184.
185.
186.

DiMeo, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523.
Id. The relevant comments on Mr. Max's website are as follows:
(a) "Maybe you should find your validation elsewhere ... preferably at the
end of a magnum";
(b) "I just wanted to let you know that I think that you are the biggest piece
of sh*t I have ever heard of and I hope that you die soon";
(c) "Now I know why Arlen Specter got invited to all those Renamity parties!
Could it be ... bribery of your local politician";
(d) "He's got a neat, nice little page there from which we can harass him";
(e) "I can't believe no one has killed him yet";
(f) "You threw an absolutely disastrous party on New Year's Eve precipitated by false advertising and possible fraud."
47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(3).
318 F.3d 465 (2003).
DiMeo, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523.
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Judge Dalzell noted, the VAWA Re-authorization contains exceptions similar to those in the CDA.'87
Second, DiMeo may well have intended to use the suit to silence
or punish Max for speech that he simply did not like. None of the
supposedly defamatory statements in the complaint were made by
Max, and none of them are particularly defamatory on their face.
Notwithstanding this or the thorough drubbing his claim received
from Judge Dalzell, DiMeo has filed a notice of appeal, signaling
that he intends to bring the matter to the Third Circuit.1 88
More importantly, DiMeo has all but admitted that his goal is to
run up Max's legal bills. In response to an e-mail from "Alana"
asking "[are you] just being more cautious.., since you got b*tch
slapped by Tucker Max," DiMeo responded with amazing candor:
"Ask Tucker how much he spent on attorney's fees. Who's the
bitch now? hahaha... I'm not done with Tucker and his following
of losers. The legal suits are comin. Hold on to your seats. The
fun has just begun."'8 9 Another MySpace commenter asked Mr.
DiMeo how the lawsuit against Max was proceeding; DiMeo responded that it was "going quite well," that he intended to pursue
litigation against the other posters, and that "[e]ither way. [sic] I
win," because posters would each have to spend "at least $50,000
each in legal fees." 9 '
Max's website is large enough that he generates a fair amount
of traffic, from which he generates substantial ad revenue. He is
most likely able to cover his costs. Moreover, his status as a former law student seems to have garnered him a large following of
lawyers, who identified many of the problems with DiMeo's suit.
Such resources are by no means a guarantee that a website operator will avoid liability. Even experts in the field such as Eugene
Volokh, for example, initially overlooked the fact that the VAWA
reauthorization was only a criminal statute, and that Max was
therefore unlikely to suffer any liability.'
Max has also confirmed that while a single lawsuit was bearable, multiple frivolous
suits such as this could pose a real threat to his site.'92

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Notice of Appeal, No. 06-1544 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 2006).
E-mail from Anthony III to "Alana" (May 29, 2006) (on file with the author).
E-mail from Anthony III to "Scott" (July 10, 2006) (on file with author).
Volokh, httpJ/volokh.com/posts/1142900679.shtml.
Interview with Tucker Max, conducted June 29, 2006.
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IV. FEDERAL ANTI-SLAPP LEGISLATION AS
A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
The current state of the law guarantees victory on the merits for
a third party internet publisher, but for the modern internet publisher, that may not be enough. DiMeo's attorney was not particularly aggressive, and Judge Dalzell moved quickly in dismissing
the suit. But this will not always be the case. In many jurisdictions, by the time the judge rules on a motion to dismiss, expensive, time-consuming, and potentially embarrassing discovery will
already have taken place. Moreover, there is no guarantee that a
case will be dismissed on a 12(b)(6) motion - a clever plaintiff will
simply plead that a defendant actually published his own content,
or played an active enough role in editing to qualify as a content
provider. Clearly, an additional level of protection is needed to nip
SLAPP's in the bud. This Article examines some potential solutions.
A.

What Not To Do

Before examining anti-SLAPP legislation, it is worth inquiring
into other proposed initiatives for cyber-space. Some authors have
not "felt the pain" of internet plaintiffs, and have suggested that
the protections of the CDA should be constricted, at least to the
point of retaining distributor liability for internet publishers.193
The problem with this argument is that while the authors are
unanimous in their suggestion that someone who is "cyber-libeled"
would have no recourse after the CDA, the facts suggest differently. The CDA does not stand as an absolute bar to lawsuits
brought as a result of postings on the internet. Rather, it is a bar
only against suing the ISP. While a victim of cyber-defamation
may not be able to sue the deep pocket, he can certainly sue the
poster. Several authors - as well as several courts - have suggested that this is actually not an impossible chore. While forcing
an ISP to reveal the identity of anonymous internet speakers
raises First Amendment concerns, it is not a per se violation of the

193. David A. Myers, Defamation and the Quiescent Anarchy of the Internet: A Case
Study of Cyber Targeting, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 667, 667 (2006) (suggesting that the § 230
of the CDA be narrowed to account for "targeting" or "cyber-bullying"); Sewali K. Patel,
note, Immunizing Internet Service Providersfrom Third-PartyInternet Defamation Claims:
How FarShould Courts Go, 55 VAND. L. REV. 647 (2002).
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First Amendment, especially if the posting is truly defamatory. 9 4
Thus, unmasking the defamatory speaker may well be an option.
While the poster may well be judgment-proof, that is beside the
point - the goal of tort law is to make a plaintiff whole vis-A-vis a
party who caused him injury subject to public policy concerns, not
vis-&-vis a party with only a tangential relationship to the injury.9
Unless the proprietor of the message board has taken an
active role in developing the supposedly defamatory content, the
good served by the internet is likely outweighed by the need of the
plaintiff to be made whole by a defendant whose relationship to
the creation of the defamatory content is marginal at best.
Other proposed solutions have focused on the chill that defamation suits pose in cyberspace, and have proceeded accordingly.
Professor Tribe has suggested a constitutional amendment to protect internet sources.'9 6 Professor Lidsky has suggested that the
opinion privilege 97 be adapted to cyberspace, and recognize that
internet sources by their nature tend to play "fast and loose" with
the facts, more readily giving rise to an inference that they are
inherently unreliable than are print pieces.9 8 This notion has
found some support in the courts.'9 9 Indeed, Judge Dalzell made
just such a point in DiMeo v. Max, writing that "[a]fter viewing
the tuckermax.com message boards, which are read by people using screen names like 'Jerkoff,' 'Drunken DJ,' and 'footinmouth,'
the intended audience could not mistake the site for the New York
Times. In short, it palpably is not serious." °°

194. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com; Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3; Doe v.
2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash. 2001); Jennifer O'Brien, supra note 29, at 2758.
195. See, e.g., Palsgrafv. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928).
196. See Kean J. Decarlo, note and comment, Tilting at Windmills: Defamation and the
PrivatePerson in Cyberspace, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 547, 571 (1997).
197. Supra notes 66-69.
198. See Lidsky, supra note 94, at 936-44. See also O'Brien, supra note 29, at 2753-54.
199. See, e.g., SPX Corp. v. Doe, 253 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Ohio 2003) ("Such message
boards are accessible to anyone of the tens of millions of people in this country (and more
abroad) with Internet access, and no one exerts control over the content. Pseudonym screen
names are the norm. A reasonable reader would not view the blanket, unexplained statements at issue as 'facts' when placed on such an open and uncontrolled forum."); Global
Telemedia Intern., Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1267 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Doe v. Cahill,
884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) ("Blogs and chat rooms tend to be vehicles for the expression of
opinions; by their very nature, they are not a source of facts or data upon which a reasonable person would rely.").
200. DiMeo, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 531 n.14. See also Penn Warranty Corp. v. DiGiovanni,
810 N.Y.S.2d 807, 2005 WL 2741947, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).
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Others have suggested that the public/private figure distinction... makes little sense in cyberspace. Indeed, this argument
In
was quite popular when the internet was in its infancy. 2
Gertz, the Supreme Court put forward two rationales justifying
the lower standard of proof for private plaintiffs. First, Justice
Powell noted that the public figure generally had some pulpit for
rebuttal, something generally not available to the private individual. °3 Second, Justice Powell noted that public figures had interjected themselves into the public sphere, with an eye toward influencing policy. 20 4 In cyberspace, by contrast, while someone can
"libel [someone] instantly in front of one and a half million people," a person can also "post a nearly universal and instantaneous
response. " "5 Indeed, it appears that DiMeo did just that in response to the initial posts of Mr. Max." 6 This would weaken
Gertz's first rationale, at least with regard to a message board or
comment-enabled blog where the plaintiffs postings were allowed
to remain intact. Also, given the newfound power of the blogosphere to influence policy,0 7 it may well be the case that, at
least with respect to bloggers, the second prong of the Gertz rationale has been weakened. Accepting such a rationale, however,
would arguably have the unintended effect of chilling discourse in
cyberspace by encouraging people to remove themselves from the

201. Supra notes 66-69.
202. E.g., Jeremy Stone Weber, Note, Defining Cyberlibel:A FirstAmendment Limit for
Libel Suits Against IndividualsArising from Computer Bulletin Board Speech, 46 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 235 (1995). But see Michael Hadley, supra note 53, at 478 (arguing that the
Gertz doctrine should remain intact for internet purposes).
203. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
204. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
205. Weber, supra note 202, at 262 (quoted in Hadley, supra note 53, at 491). This argument is difficult to assess. A website that did not have comments or that repeatedly
deleted a defamed plaintiffs responses would retain the upper hand. A defamed plaintiff
could easily build his own rejoinder on blogspot, but it is unclear how much attention this
would receive. The most popular search engine on the net - Google - ranks sites by the
number and popularity of sites that link to a given site, so a rejoinder may, in fact, go unheard. Still, if a plaintiff does in fact respond on a particular site, or is given a forum on
which to respond, this factor may well lead toward a different response in cyberspace than
inprint media.
206. Interview with Tucker Max, conducted June 29, 2006. Also, Max linked DiMeo's
site directly numerous times, giving DiMeo ample opportunity to respond, if he had so
desired. Indeed, the first state supreme court case to consider defamation on a blog made
similar observations. See John Doe 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 455 (Del. 2005) ([T~he internet now allows anyone with a phone line to 'become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox."). Of course, one does not even need a phone
line for broadband cable internet, or to pick up a wireless signal at the nearest caf6.
207. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
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internet in hopes of being able to maintain the lower negligence
standard of liability."8
Regardless, while both of these solutions would enhance the
ability of publishers to defend themselves, such solutions really
only nibble around the edges of the problem this Article identifies.
The problem is not, generally speaking, that the internet defendant will not have an easy time defending himself from his own
defamatory content. Rather, the problem is that he will have to
pay large sums of money to prove his already-clearly-available
defense if he is sued either for printing clearly non-defamatory
content on his site or for defamatory content posted by others on
his website. The focus here is on whether an owner of a successful
message board or blog should be forced to make the choice between hiring an army of comment-checkers, or turning off the discourse on his site altogether.
B.

Anti-SLAPP Legislation as a Solution to the Problem of
"Cyber-Chilling"

Nearly half of the states in the Union have anti-SLAPP legisla9
tion of some form on their books," up from sixteen in 2001.21
Perhaps the most famous is California's. Under the California
version of the law, "[a] cause of action against a person arising
from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of
petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a
special motion to strike." 211 The goal of this motion to strike is to
allow for early dismissal of meritless cases aimed at chilling expression through costly, time-consuming litigation.2 "2 Thus, under
the terms of this statute, the law is construed broadly, 13' and the

208. On yet another hand, one can easily imagine Ken Zeran meeting the actual malice
standard - in other words, this would not be a complete removal of the tort of defamation in
cyberspace. And indeed neither Zeran nor Blumenthal - nor any defendant arbitrarily
picked on by a website who did not maintain a web presence - would be affected by such a
change in the law.
209. Other States: Statutes & Cases, httpJwww.casp.net/menstate.html (last visited
July 9, 2006). For an explanation of these various statutes, see
httpJ/www.firstamendmentcenter.orgabout.aspx?id= 13565 (last visited July 6, 2006).
210. See Joseph R. Furman, Comment, Cybersmear or Cyber-SLAPP: Analyzing Defamation Suits Against Online John Does as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,25
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 213, 215 (2001).
211. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(3).
212. Metabolife Int'l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001).
213. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a).
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ability to initiate an anti-SLAPP motion extends even to a nonparty's assertion of a right to remain anonymous.2 14
Upon filing an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, all discovery is
immediately stayed, subject to the possibility of a court order "for
good cause shown." 215 The burden is then on the defendant to
show that "the plaintiffs suit arises from an act by the defendant
made in connection with a public issue in furtherance of the defendant's right to free speech under the United States or California Constitution." 216 The plaintiff must then show a probability
that she will prevail on the claim. The motion is similar to a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, in that the defendant is somewhat
bound to the facts alleged in the complaint; however he or she is
allowed to submit affidavits in support of the motion."' Ifa party
fails on their motion to strike, discovery is no longer tolled, and
the case proceeds apace. 21 8 If, however, a party succeeds, then he
is allowed to recover costs of the litigation.2 19 Similar protections
are available to a plaintiff, if the court finds the motion to strike to
be frivolous or brought solely for delay. 22° Finally, immediate appeal is granted from the denial of a motion to strike.2 21
Such legislation could similarly work on the federal level. Although the general rule in American courts is that attorney's fees
are not available to a prevailing party,2 the federal statutes are
rife with exceptions to the rule. For example, a prevailing plaintiff
in a civil rights action is entitled to recover attorney's fees,223 while
both prevailing plaintiffs and defendants may seek attorneys fees
under the Copyright Act.224 In many ways, this would merely
make cases involving First Amendment rights into another such
exception. Similarly, federal courts already have a wide degree of
discretion over discovery, and may even choose to stay discovery
at the outset if they believe the case is frivolous. A federal antiSLAPP law would merely be a more stringent version of what al-
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See Rancho Publ'ns v. Superior Ct., 68 Cal. App. 4th 1538, 1541 (4th Dis. App. Ct.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g).
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 2003).
Metabolife, 264 F.3d at 840.
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1024.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c).
Id.
Id. § 425.16(0).
See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
17 U.S.C. § 505; Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 520-21 (1994).
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ready exists in federal court, commensurate with the importance
of the First Amendment rights that it would protect.
It would also help ameliorate the problems described above.
With a federal anti-SLAPP law, an individual would not have to
submit to costly discovery while waiting for a motion to dismiss to
be ruled upon. Moreover, with the possibility of recovering fees, a
defendant with empty pockets would be empowered to fight the
case, at least at the outset. Finally, by receiving a preliminary
ruling from a judge early on regarding the merits of a case, a
guilty defendant could be encouraged to settle or recant the defamatory speech, rather than fight on, delaying justice for the
plaintiff.
C.

Responses to Criticisms

While federal anti-SLAPP legislation may well be a solution to
the problems encountered with regard to frivolous lawsuits in the
blogopshere, some may counter that Rule 11 sanctions or other
statutory provisions such as 28 U.S.C. § 1927 already offer a similar response to frivolous suits. However, a preliminary ruling in
Max v. Dimeo indicates just how difficult it can be to win such a
sanction.
Max v. Dimeo was filed in Pennsylvania state court on March
10, 2006.225 Thirteen days later, Max accepted process and removed to federal court on April 12, 2006.226 DiMeo moved to remand, arguing that because thirty days had passed since Max first
became aware of the lawsuit and saw a copy of the complaint apparently from a third party news source - his time for removal
had run.22
The problem with this argument is that it had been squarely
foreclosed by the Supreme Court in Murphy Brothers, Inc. v.
Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.228 Max's attorney sent a letter to DiMeo's attorney, Matthew Weisberg, informing him of this case
law, and the hopeless nature of his case."' Max then moved for
sanctions, arguing that the motion was frivolous. The Court demurred. The Court noted in unusually strong language that
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Order, DiMeo v. Max, No. 06-1544 (E.D, Pa. May 25, 2006).
Id.
Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
536 U.S. 344 (1999).
Order. at 3.
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Weisberg's actions had been at the very least on the borderline of
sanctionable:
(p) to be sure, Weisberg exercised very poor judgment; (q)
[bly refusing to withdraw such a frivolous motion Weisberg forced counsel at a major Philadelphia law firm to do
legal research, write a formal response, and then file it all at a cost to Max; (r) Weisberg also wasted the time of
the Court and, in turn, the United States taxpayers; (s)
Weisberg's poor judgment is compounded by his request
to file a supplemental brief; (t) [e]xpecting that Weisberg
would use this opportunity to withdraw the petition, we
granted his request; (u) [i]t was thus surprising indeed
when Weisberg subsequently advised us - just ten minutes before his brief was due - that he had decided not to
avail himself of the very opportunity he himself requested; (v) [iun short, Weisberg's actions reflect a blatant
disregard for the time of opposing counsel, his client's adversary, and this Court, and he would be well advised to
change0 his ways the next time he appears in federal
23
court.

Even given these egregious facts, however, the Court found that
sanctions were not appropriate, given the high Third Circuit standard.23' One is left to wonder what standards would justify sanctions, if an attorney who is put on notice of the frivolous nature of
his suit or motion refuses to withdraw the suit or motion. A federal anti-SLAPP rule would remedy this problem, at least where
fundamental First Amendment freedoms are at stake.
A stronger objection is that the fee-shifting arrangement in the
statute may well chill plaintiffs from seeking redress. 32 As one
author eloquently writes:
"SLAPP" . . . is, both on its face and as discussed in the
literature, a pejorative term that vilifies the motives of
the plaintiff and idealizes the motives of the defendant.
230. Id. at 4.
231. Id. at n.1; see also Baker Indus. Inc. v. Cerberus, Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 208 (3d Cir.
1985) (noting that to justify sanctions, the conduct must be "of an egregious nature,
stamped by bad faith that is violative of recognized standards in the conduct of litigation").
232. See Joseph W. Beatty, Note, The Legal Literature on SLAPPs: A Look Behind the
Smoke Nine Years After Professors Pring and Canan First Yelled "Fire!",9 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POLY 85 n.182 (1997).
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The onesidedness of this presentation raises the specter
of the tyranny of a zealous majority over the hapless
plaintiff who is despised because that plaintiffs case
happens to resemble the paradigm SLAPP.2 33
There is, of course, truth to this criticism. Plaintiffs who have
valid-yet-borderline claims may well decide not to bring suit because of the fear of being forced to pay a defendants' legal bills,
especially if the defendant is a large corporation. But such tradeoffs are present in all legal matters, and indeed it is difficult to see
why a defamation defendant should get less protection than, say, a
copyright defendant. The choice between forcing a wronged plaintiff to go uncompensated because he does not want to pay legal
bills if he loses, or forcing an innocent defendant to remove constitutionally protected speech because he cannot afford his own legal
bills if he wins, strikes the author as a relatively easy choice. Under an anti-SLAPP statute, the plaintiff is ultimately only forced
to incur cost if he has, in fact, brought a lawsuit that is unlikely to
succeed. The defendant, however, will always incur substantial
costs absent an anti-SLAPP statute. More importantly, he will
have done so in the exercise of his First Amendment rights. At
the very least, this is only an attack on the fee-shifting portions of
the California Act - even simply providing for a stay of discovery
and an expedited preliminary hearing could go far to validate the
rights of a defendant, especially a sole proprietor such as a modem blogger.
Finally, one could object that this is a decision for states to
make, and not the federal government. While there is some truth
to this, all too often this argument is reductionist in its nature.
Some things truly are best left to the states, but it by no means
follows from that that all things must be left to the states. Here,
we are presented with a situation where a federally guaranteed
right is being chilled. Surely, it is the emphatic duty of the federal
government to ensure those rights are being protected. Also, this
is a situation where states are fulfilling their roles as laboratories
of democracy; the federal government can now look at the results
in a state such as California versus a state such as Pennsylvania,
decide that it would prefer to see a message board proprietor such
as Mr. Max protected from frivolous lawsuits as he would be in
California no matter where he resides, and enact a federal statute.
233.
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CONCLUSION

The advent of the blogosphere is an exciting development for the
country, and indeed for the world. Persons in America may now
read and even offer commentary upon unfiltered firsthand accounts of the war in Iraq from an Iraqi,234 may follow an otherwiseunknown chefs recipes on a daily basis, 35' or observe the exploits
of an obscure computer programmer in Louisiana as he restores
his dream car.236 Truly, this is a degree of freedom of and access to
information about which previous generations had only dreamed.
To keep this newfound freedom intact, however, requires a certain
degree of vigilance. New threats will crop up that no one had anticipated, and old threats will resurface in new forms. The Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation is just such a threat.
As the lawsuit against Tucker Max shows - and as earlier suits
against the U-Hell plaintiffs show - plaintiffs can use the mere
threat of litigation as a powerful weapon to silence points of view
that they do not like, even points of view that are clearly protected
by Congressional action, or by the First Amendment. A federal
statute that placed some type of premium on bringing such an action would certainly go a long way toward remedying the harm
such actions cause.
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